BlawgDog | 博铎法豆

“早”不等于“好”:从犹他州的变态新商标立法被狂批说起

  在网络与电子商务法领域,美国犹他州经常敢为天下先——该州1995年通过的“数字签名法”被认为是世界上第一部电子商务立法,但该法因违背技术中立原则而被实践所抛弃(详细评述看J. K. Winn的论文“皇帝的新装”——张楚老师和我翻译的该文中译本刊登于《知识产权前沿报告(第一卷)》);2004年犹他州出台“间谍软件控制法”,彻底否定具有某些特定功能的软件的合法性,该法因再次违背技术中立原则而于2005年的修正案中被删除主要内容;2005年犹他州又全美第一个出台法律要求网络接入服务商过滤和封锁被犹他州司法部长认为淫秽的网站,但该法又因为遭到违宪质疑而不得不被修改

  上个月,在新出台的“商标保护法案”中,犹他州的议员们又率先发明了一个“电子登记商标”(Electronic Registration Mark,ERM)的概念,并将其与既有的商品商标和服务商标相并列。根据这个法案,世界上任何一个可以在犹他州访问到的网站,或者住址位于犹他州的任何一个想在网络上打广告的人,都不得在网络关键词广告中,插入根据该法案而在犹他州商标管理当局注册的所谓ERM,否则将承担与商品商标一样的侵权责任。该法案还要求犹他州的商标管理机关(Division of Corporations and Commercial Code within the Department of Commerce)建立一套数据库,用作ERM的登记注册和公布。这样就等于对Google等各大网络企业的关键词广告业务(Adwords, Keywords Ad, etc.)宣判了死刑——任何人都可以到犹他州的网吧上几小时的网,交275美金把自己经常用到的关键词、或者美国总统的名字“Bush”、或者我养的一条叫“BLawg”的狗的名字注册一下,随即取证证明在这个网吧访问到甲乙丙丁XYZ等等网站的广告中存在自己注册的所谓ERM,再走几步路到犹他州地方法院里递个状子,然后就可以等着收赔偿金了。

  一名叫Darren D. Johnson的Blogger在犹他州议员为此法案辩护的网页上留言:“我已经等不及投票把你轰出办公室了”,另一位匿名的兄弟则说:“我得出的唯一结论是:您(指参议员)痛恨自由市场(经济)。”而圣克拉拉大学的网络法专家Eric Goldman更在BLOG上简单明了地用了一个“WTF?”(What The F…k)形容这个无理的立法。至于我对它的评价,呵呵,发挥下中文优势——谁让这个法案的文件号是“S.B. 236”呢?(不好意思,跟着洋人当了一回粗人,但是鉴于该参议员在他文采飞扬的辩护文章中,用了让俺们不爽的“Shanghaied”这个单词——“In some cases people invest millions on their trademark, only to have their customers’ on-line word searches shanghaied by a pirate who bought off the search engines.”——再鉴于即使不考虑这个单词的民族感情问题,这句话也跟这个法案一样是无理的,所以稍微粗一下。

  犹他州一连串的立法故事告诉我们:“早”,不等于“好”。不了解特定制度的局限,不明白互联网的规律,就忙着出台些奇形怪状的法律,除了浪费纳税人的钱以增加GDP和增加抱怨网站的点击率以外,没什么好处。国人们忙着引用外国立法例的时候,千万要谨记这一条。其实,相似的神仙立法在中国也不是没有(而且可以说不少)——从当年一些地方出台的所谓“网站名称管理暂行办法”(犹州发明的“新型商标”跟这个东西何其相似,估计到了中国它还真的缺乏新颖性),到如今盛嚣尘上的所谓“博客实名”,大体都属于这一类。最麻烦的是,因为对规范性文件之合法性缺乏完备的审查机制,一旦我们的某个立法跟了风、赶了早却又出了错,还不能像人家美国牛仔一样及时让它善终,那可真就是相当地尴尬了。

关于搜狗词库是否构成作品的澄清

  感谢洪祖运我关于搜狗的词库的观点评论,我的表述的确不太严谨。但是,尽管对搜狐是否享有版权存在事实认定的问题,保守地说,我不应该武断地认定其就是汇编作品,但从报道的事实看,这种认定的盖然性还是占优的。

  首先,您说的Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. Inc中,认定Rural Tel Co的白页不享有版权,原告因而不构成侵权。判决理由在于法官认为系争客体属于单纯的facts,而没有达到版权法上的originality标准。这个案件与Google这次遇到的争议不同(这个下面说),其意义不在于确定事实的汇编是否构成作品(这个已经早确定了),而在于否定了之前一些美国判决采取的“出小汗原则”(sweat of the brow),而重申了行为人主动选择和编排在“originality”之构成要件中的核心地位。

  其次,什么是originality,在美国法就是“independent creation plus a modicum of creativity”,在德国法就是所谓的“小硬币原则”。换句话说,只要不仅仅是单纯依据事实的排列,而有些微的创新或者发展,那么这个东西就是享有版权的作品。Google和搜狗争议中,对这一问题,涉及证据问题,我们不能了解,所以不可能深入讨论。但至少有一点,编排的过程中,显然有创造(员工名字),换句话说,即使按照美国法,至少、至少,这部分创造肯定是享有版权的。因为只要有original selection or arrangement,即使这些被选择和排列的东西本身是事实,也已经达到了originality的标准。

  其次,慢说中国法与美国法不同,中国法看法条,美国案件不具备羁束力。即使按照美国法,应用先例羁束原则(Stare Decisis)的前提是“必要事实”(Necessary Facts)类似,而不是说案件大致一致就行了。在那个案件中,关键事实不在于被编辑的东西中有本来就存在的事实,而在于两点:(1)Rural Tel Co没有选择和编排,而仅仅是按照姓氏字母顺序进行了排列——而之所以按照字母顺序,是因为Rural Tel所在的州法律有这样的要求;(2)Feist并没有直接把Rural Tel Co的白页拿过来用,而是将其中的“事实数据”,即用户的名字、城市和电话号码抽出来放在自己的目录中。但是,在Google这次遇到的麻烦中,词汇是事实,拼音是事实,可是词汇的排列则肯定不是事实范畴的东西,更不用说它是整个地把词库拿过来用了。

Private property: conceptual and normative analyse

Private property: conceptual and normative analyses (property rights, intellectual property)

Wenar, Leif Edward.

online access from Digital Dissertation Consortium
Thesis (Ph.D.)–Harvard University, 1997.

Summary
 This thesis offers conceptual and normative analyses of private property. Chapter one presents a conceptual analysis. Chapters two and three use this analysis to address prominent theories of what kind of property rights we ought to have. Chapter four criticizes the dominant legal conception of property, and chapter five reconceptualizes intellectual property while evaluating the application of various philosophical theories to it. The main conclusions of these chapters are that there is a coherent and interesting core conception of property, and that the justifiability of any set of property rights will turn on how those rights bear on a diverse set of human interests.
 Chapter one demonstrates that the core conception of property can be identified with the objects of a two-layered structure of Hohfeldian rights. This conception is shown to lie at the overlap of other conceptions of property (commodities, assets, etc.), and to be helpful in describing the complexities of modern property systems.
 Chapter two criticizes familiar Lockean arguments (labor-mixing, desert, etc.) that purport to establish the contemporary relevance of original acquisition of private property.
 Chapter three probes the libertarian disregard for the patterns of ownership that would be generated by a strong right to transfer property. It argues that libertarians can only justify their favored right by referring to the patterns of interests that would result from the right’s exercise. Topics include taxation and self-ownership.
 Chapter four traces the history of interpretation of the takings clause of the US Constitution from the point when the legal academy embraced a mistaken conception of what property is. It explains how the improbable idea that property is rights (not things) drew commentators such as Michelman, Sax, and Epstein toward unnecessarily counterintuitive readings of the clause.
 Chapter five finds that copyright is importantly different from property rights in tangible things. Lockean and Hegelian approaches to copyright are therefore found to be substantially misconceived. Libertarian and law-and-economics approaches to copyright are conceptually better, but do not adequately represent the value pluralism that is integral to all plausible property law.

public domain, personal interest and the copyright

No way in: The public domain, personal interest and the evolution of copyright
Breyer, John Stewart.

Thesis (Ph.D.)–The University of Southern Mississippi, 2004.
online access from Digital Dissertation Consortium

Summary
The root of American copyright law can be found in Article 1, section 8, paragraph 8, of the Constitution. The concept is simple. The law exists "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." The law that has evolved from this simple concept is complex and contentious. After more than two and one quarter centuries of evolution, it continues to expand. This research reviews the history of copyright and reflects upon the conflict among the elements that have shaped American copyright law. The dissertation draws upon legal cases that have ultimately determined how the law has been interpreted and distinguishes between two primary factions, the creators and the public. 

The author contends that there are four primary arguments that are mounted to persuade courts, lawmakers, and the public that the original tenets of copyright are no longer functional. The arguments of tangibility, originality, technology, and property are reviewed in detail. The research reveals how employment of these arguments has effectively distracted legislators and the public from the original purpose of American copyright. The result of these distractions is revealed in this research.

Authorship and the discourse of literary property

Negotiating copyright: Authorship and the discourse of literary property rights in nineteenth-century America (James Fenimore Cooper, Walt Whitman, Harriet Beecher Stowe, Mark Twain, Emily Dickinson).

Buinicki, Martin Thomson, Jr.
Thesis (Ph.D.)–The University of Iowa, 2003.
online access from Digital Dissertation Consortium

Summary
“Negotiating Copyright: Authorship and the Discourse of Literary Property Rights in Nineteenth-Century America” examines how debates over copyright law in the United States during the nineteenth century, particularly over the lack of an international copyright law, intersected with the business practices and political and artistic beliefs of American authors. These debates shaped a discourse of literary property rights that forced authors to negotiate their copyrights not only with their publishers, but with their readers as well. Employing the overlapping issues and terms discussed in newspaper editorials, legislative sessions, and the public and private writing of James Fenimore Cooper, Walt Whitman, Harriet Beecher Stowe, Samuel Clemens, and Emily Dickinson, this dissertation demonstrates how authors found themselves in an uneasy opposition to their reading public. Authors were forced to stake their claim to their rights as property holders while at the same time fending off criticism that literary works should be easily and cheaply available within the rapidly expanding American literary marketplace. As a result, the act of taking out a copyright was more than a mere legal mechanism marking a transition from amateur to professional or artist to businessperson. Taking out a copyright had a profound impact on how audiences viewed authors, how authors perceived their profession, and how they represented individual rights and property ownership within their texts.

case study of Taiwan's copyright law reform

A long journey toward intellectual property protection [electronic resource] : A case study of Taiwan’s copyright law reform (China).

Thesis (Ph.D.)–University of Missouri – Columbia, 2001.
online access from Digital Dissertation Consortium

Summary
This study examines the development of copyright protection in Taiwan, from cultural, political, historical and legal points of view and from a variety of sources, including in-depth personal interviews with government officials, lawyers, scholars and officers of intellectual property protection organizations who have either participated in Taiwan’s copyright reform or in the copyright negotiations with the United States. This study also explores underlying factors behind Taiwan’s copyright revolution from the perspectives of press theories and intellectual property theories.
 The author finds that copyright infringement of foreign and domestic works were rampant in Taiwan throughout the second half of the twentieth century because of several historical factors: political, legal, and economic concerns. But lack of the concept of copyright or intellectual property in general in the society was the underpinning factor. In other words, there has been a huge cultural difference between the West and Taiwan in the aspect of intellectual property protection throughout the history of their respective civilizations. This helps explain why copyright piracy was not a concern among the Taiwanese citizens and the Taiwan government until the United States started to pressure Taiwan for improvement with the threat of trade sanctions. Forces behind Taiwan’s copyright reform included external/foreign pressure as well as internal/domestic forces.
 In addition to providing a comprehensive history and analysis of the copyright dispute between the United States and Taiwan and creating a whole new understanding of Taiwan’s copyright reform and the copyright disputes between the two nations, this study also reveals that underlying the comprehensive history of the copyright disputes between the United States and Taiwan, there are the missing elements within the literature about policy toward intellectual property rights in a free or controlled press/speech system. And those elements are important in helping scholars more comprehensively understand how each press/speech system is conceived and operates.
 Most previous literature that discusses free and controlled press systems does not comprehensively explain the importance of intellectual property rights within each tradition. This study suggests that literature should include more intellectual property rights traditions in understanding both press/speech systems.